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EMERGENCY SERVICES TO THE RESCUE, OR NOT, AGAIN. 
Dr Kevin Williams* 
Introduction 
In a previous issue of the Journal, I argued that the common law of negligence should 
recognise that the publicly funded emergency services have a duty to rescue.1 It was 
suggested that the current liability regime which potentially imposes liability on 
ambulance trusts but exempts the police, fire, and coastguard services from any similar 
duty of professional rescue is unjust and makes little practical or doctrinal sense. The 
'no duty' stance appears to have resulted from an unwarranted extension of the partial 
immunity granted to the police in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 
when fighting crime to the very different context of fire crews and others when saving 
lives. Two recent Court of Appeal decisions were cited as indicating a welcome 
willingness to re-evaluate the limits of the core immunity in Hill and hence as 
undermining the supposed foundation of the 'no duty' rule as it applies to the 
emergency services when acting as rescuers.2 Despite the House of Lords on a conjoined 
appeal having since reversed both decisions,3 this outcome is not fatal to the continuing 
argument in favour of a duty of professional rescue, as we shall see. However, we must 
first briefly turn to consider their Lordships decision that, absent special circumstances, 
the police ordinarily have no common law duty to protect individuals from harm caused 
by the violent, criminal conduct of others, albeit there may be liability for a breach of 
the victim's human rights. 
 
The Van Colle decision.          
Giles Van Colle was shot dead by a former employee he had accused of theft. Reversing 
Cox J and the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords unanimously rejected a claim under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 alleging breach of the 'right to life' in Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. No claim was made for common law 
negligence. 
It is clear that in order to meet its obligations under Article 2, a signatory state and its 
agents (such as the police) may have to take positive steps to protect those whose life or 
physical safety is put at serious risk by the criminal behaviour of third parties. However, 
in Osman v UK (1998) 29 EHRR 245 the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg had held 
that a claimant must show that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the 
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relevant time of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual, and that 
they had unreasonably failed to take such measures as might have been expected to 
avoid that risk - this is the 'Osman test'. In deciding what could properly be expected, 
the Strasbourg Court [at 116] said that regard must be had to 'the difficulties involved 
in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct, the operational 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources' and the need to avoid 
imposing 'an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities'. 
After a particularly careful review of the evidence, the House unanimously held that the 
information reasonably available to the police prior to the shooting was not such as 
should have led them to conclude that they ought to act to protect Van Colle's life from 
a grave and immediate risk. Cox J was criticised for succumbing to hindsight rather 
than considering what the investigating officer did or should have known immediately 
before the shooting. Although two intimidating 'phone calls to drop the theft charge had 
earlier been sent, there had been no explicit threat of death or serious violence. Given 
that the accused had no recent history of violence, and had been charged with a 
relatively minor property offence which would probably not have attracted a custodial 
sentence, their Lordships concluded it was unlikely that the police should have 
concluded that Van Colle was in immediate danger of being attacked, much less 
murdered.  
So, there was no breach on the facts. Lord Brown [at 115] noted that while neither gross 
negligence or reckless disregard are necessary, the Osman test is 'stringent' and 'not 
easily satisfied'. Lord Bingham [at 39] said 'the warning signs were very much less clear 
and obvious than those in Osman', which had (surprisingly, perhaps) been found by the 
Strasbourg court inadequate to meet the test.4 
Moreover, the courts below had been wrong to say that the police had a greater 
responsibility or that the Osman test was lower because the murdered victim was to be a 
witness; this conferred no specially protected status on him. 
 
The Smith decision. 
In Smith, a man had been attacked with a claw hammer and seriously injured by his 
former male partner. Smith had earlier complained to the police on several occasions 
about a large number of lurid and explicit death threats sent by 'phone, text and e-mail.  
Lord Carswell [at 107] noted, somewhat incredulously, that 'for some reason for which 
no explanation has been put forward they declined to look at the messages containing 
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the threats, make an entry in their notebooks, take a statement from Mr Smith or 
complete a crime form'. 
By a majority, the House nonetheless rejected Smith's claim for damages for common 
law negligence. Though the parties were 'proximate', the identity of the potential 
attacker and victim known, the attack reasonably foreseeable, and the failure to act 
grave, the police owed Smith no duty of care. Two policy considerations in particular 
were said to dictate this conclusion - the risk that the possibility of liability would result 
in 'defensive policing', and the unproductive diversion of scarce resources.5 Accordingly, 
it was not, as the Caparo test requires, 'fair, just and reasonable' to impose a duty.6 
Thus, the supremacy of what their Lordships in Smith called the 'core principle' in Hill  
was re-asserted, namely, that absent special circumstances, the police when 
investigating or combating crime owe no duty to protect individuals from criminally 
violent behaviour by others.  This was so notwithstanding that Hill's facts are plainly 
distinguishable. In Smith, the identity and whereabouts of the attacker and his victim 
were known to the police in advance. 
Despite the numerous and glaring failures by the police and the claimant's morally 
strong case based on what Lord Brown [at 125] called 'really very strong facts', the 
majority nonetheless believed that the 'no duty' rule was necessary for the benefit of the 
wider general public whose interests would suffer if the police were to be distracted 
from fighting crime in a 'robust manner' by the threat of liability should they get things 
badly wrong. Lord Hope [at 75] openly recognised that a 'principle of public policy that 
applies generally may be seen to operate harshly in some cases…Those indeed are the 
cases where…the interests of the wider community must prevail over those of the 
individual'. Lord Carswell similarly [at 106] said that 'the price of the certainty of the 
rule and the freedom from liability afforded to police officers is that some citizens who 
have very good reason to complain…will not have a remedy in negligence'. 
There was a strong, albeit unavailing dissent from Lord Bingham who favoured the 
recognition of a 'liability principle', derived from human rights jurisprudence. His 
Lordship said [at 44] that 'if a member of the public (A) furnishes a police officer (B) 
with apparently credible evidence that a third party whose identity and whereabouts 
are known presents a specific and imminent threat to his life or physical safety, B owes 
A a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent it being executed'.  Lord Bingham asserted 
that this principle was not inconsistent with the ratio of either Hill or Brooks v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24. 7 
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The majority did not agree. They rejected the 'liability principle' as unworkable, as 
tending to uncertainty, and as being likely to undermine the very protection which it 
was the purpose of the core 'no duty' rule in Hill to provide.8 
Moreover, the majority saw no pressing need to develop the common law of negligence 
or align it with the rights in the European Convention.9 The two claims have 'very 
different objectives'.  The common law is 'designed to compensate losses', while 
Convention claims are 'intended to uphold minimum human rights standards and to 
vindicate those rights'.10 Moreover, deserving victims nowadays have the option to 
claim directly under the Human Rights Act 1998. 'Any perceived shortfall' in the 
common law, said Lord Hope [at 82] can, in a suitable case falling within the Osman test, 
now be dealt with under that Act.11 Whether Smith's case did so qualify did not need to 
be decided, though Lord Brown [at 135] said it might have been 'irresistible' had it been 
lodged in time (Smith missed the one year limitation period in s. 7(5) of the Act).   
Whether this 'robust approach', which leaves the police on the spot free to decide how 
to react to threatened violence, actually is necessary to efficient policing and in the best 
interests of the community is, like its supporting policy arguments, uncorroborated by 
empirical evidence.12 The manifest unfairness to individual victims is ameliorated only 
by the possibility that the Human Rights Act may supply a remedy.   
 
The Limits of the Immunity. 
It is important to note that the police have no general immunity and may be liable for 
their own negligent acts that directly harm another, for example, by causing a traffic 
accident through careless driving.  The core 'no duty' rule applies only to cases where  
injury arises out of the manner in which the police (incompetently) investigate a crime 
with the result that a victim is attacked by a third party or otherwise suffers loss which 
might have been prevented. In contrast, there properly was liability in Reeves v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 (police failure to prevent a  
prisoner known to be vulnerable from committing suicide when in custody); Knightley v 
Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349 (senior officer mishandling aftermath of road accident so 
causing injury to police motorcyclist); Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire 
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[1985] 1 WLR 1242 (police use of CS gas canisters without having fire fighting 
equipment on hand to tackle any resulting fire).13  
Furthermore, the following decisions, which resulted in liability despite involving 
allegations of negligence in the management or investigation of crime, appear to have 
been accepted in Smith as having been rightly decided: Swinney v Chief Constable of 
Northumbria [1997] QB 464 (duty to protect the identity of an informer); Costello v 
Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] 1 All ER 550 (duty on inspector to help a female 
constable when attacked in his presence by a prisoner).14 Seemingly, the justification for 
duty in these cases rests, in part, at least, on a 'voluntary assumption of responsibility' 
towards the victim. 
 
The Immunity and the Duty to Rescue. 
The strong re-affirmation in Smith of the 'core immunity' is relevant to the separate 
question whether there should be a duty of professional rescue. The near immunity 
enjoyed by the police when fighting crime has, in the past, somewhat illogically, been 
treated as being at the root of the decisions to excuse the public emergency services 
(other than ambulance trusts) from any private law duty to go to the aid of those they 
know to be in need of immediate help.15  Thus the conclusion in Capital and Counties 
that fire brigades have no duty to fight fires because there is no sufficient 'proximity' 
was said to follow from Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328 which, despite being 
concerned with the conduct of the police when investigating a break-in, was 
unconvincingly declared to be 'indistinguishable'.16 
In practice, and contrary to the popular media image, fighting crime accounts for only a 
relatively small proportion (maybe less than a quarter) of police time.17 This common 
misperception about the nature of policing lends itself easily to treating all police work 
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as if it is a single undifferentiated whole, as well as to ignoring the varied range of 
responsibilities undertaken by the uniformed branch including their important social 
services and civil protective functions. It also lends itself to an uncritical extension of the 
core Hill immunity to other quite unrelated activities, such as rescue, whether by the 
police or other professionals. In Gibson v Orr (1999) SC 420, Lord Hamilton was 
prepared to differentiate between police tasks, declining an invitation to equate the 
investigation of crime with the civilian function of safeguarding the public against a 
known traffic hazard.  He held that when the police took responsibility for warning 
road users of the danger posed by a partially collapsed bridge, there was no immunity 
in Scots law when that responsibility was prematurely abandoned without leaving any 
cones or other warning signs with the result that an unsuspecting motorist drove onto 
the bridge and went into the river with fatal results.18 There was 'proximity' once the 
police took control of the situation. This decision, like Swinney and Costello, might be 
seen as giving rise to a duty exceptionally because it is an 'assumption of responsibility' 
case.19  However, Lord Hamilton doubted the utility of this idea where there is a risk of 
injury or death and no active reliance by the party at physical risk. Moreover, Lord 
Slynn has warned us that it may be 'misleading' to talk of 'assumption' as if it 
necessarily involves a knowing and deliberate acceptance of responsibility by a 
professional.  It may simply signify 'that the law recognises that there is a duty of care. 
It is not so much that responsibility is assumed as that it is imposed by the law'.20   
Lord Hope in Smith [at 79] referred approvingly to Gibson v Orr saying that it 'deserves 
to be read carefully'.21 His Lordship noted Lord Hamilton's refusal in Gibson to find 
any close analogy between the police 'investigating and suppressing crime', as in Hill, 
and the exercise of 'of their civil function of performing civil operational tasks 
concerned with human safety on the public roads'.22 No immunity attached to this latter 
activity, at least where there is no inherent conflict with instructions from superior 
officers or with duties owed to other persons. Lord Hope also noted [at 80] the doubts 
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expressed by Lord Hamilton concerning the correctness of the decisions in Ancell v 
McDermott, Clough v Bussan, and even Alexandrou v Oxford. Reference was also made 
in Gibson v Orr to another Scots case, Duff v Highland and Islands Fire Board (1995) 
SLT 1362, where it was doubted, obiter, whether the operational decisions of fire 
fighters are immune from challenge.23  
Accordingly, it is submitted that it can no longer be the law in England or Scotland that 
the public rescue services have no duty to rescue because the police are immune when 
undertaking the completely different task of fighting crime. Smith's case must be taken 
as compelling confirmation that Hill's 'core immunity' can only apply to the police and 
only when they are investigating or suppressing crime. 
 I suggested in my earlier article that the basic building blocks for constructing a theory 
of negligence liability were already in existence, and that a duty of professional rescue 
should be held to exist whenever a relevant authority24 knows or reasonably ought to 
know that a vulnerable, identified or identifiable person is at real and immediate risk of 
serious physical harm, injury or illness.25 On this basis, members of the emergency 
services would not be free, for example, to leave a sick person they know to be lying 
collapsed in the street and pass by on the other side, unlike the ordinary citizen who 
should continue to be free to choose whether or not to act as the Good Samaritan did. 
Whether the courts will be prepared to recognise such a duty is, of course, highly 
uncertain. They may prefer to leave an unassisted casualty to pursue any claim under 
the Human Rights Act or even await the possible introduction of some statutory 
remedy.26  However, were they to accept this invitation it does not, of course, follow that 
the emergency services would thereby be duty bound to attempt every rescue or that 
every failure would necessarily be an unreasonable breach of duty. It is to be expected 
that courts considering the question of breach would be especially sensitive to the 
nature of the emergency, the risks it presents to the rescuers, their professed skills and 
operational choices, and any constraints which competing priorities and limited time or 
resources impose. The burden the duty imposes should not be disproportionate and 
claimants should be expected to prove breach with convincing clarity. Developments are 
awaited.   
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